The Philippines' Department of Foreign Affairs this week reaffirmed that all parties engaged in the South China Sea Code of Conduct (COC) negotiations remain committed to the three-year timeline established by the 2023 Guidelines, aiming to finalize an agreement by the end of next year. This collective aspiration seeks to establish a framework of rules and mechanisms governing the conduct of claimant countries in the strategic waterway, even as recent maritime incidents heighten regional tensions. DFA Spokesperson for Maritime Affairs, Rogelio Villanueva, refrained from preempting specific announcements expected during the ASEAN gathering in Manila.
The ambition to forge a legally binding and effective Code of Conduct has been a cornerstone of regional stability efforts for decades, yet its path has been riddled with persistent obstacles. Its success hinges on resolving profound disagreements over its geographic scope, its precise legal nature, and how it would intersect with existing international law, particularly the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
An analysis by Laura Sorica, an Asia-Pacific Analyst at ACLED, highlighted a significant escalation in Chinese naval and coast guard activity across key features such as Thitu Island, Second Thomas Shoal, Sabina Shoal, and Scarborough Shoal in September, effectively doubling compared to the previous month.
In October, a Chinese Coast Guard vessel allegedly deployed water cannons close to a Philippine Coast Guard vessel, according to Philippine authorities. The incident allegedly delayed a medical evacuation.
While Beijing has consistently refuted the Philippine allegations regarding these encounters, describing its actions as "legitimate and reasonable" measures to protect its sovereignty, the persistence of such maritime and diplomatic tensions complicates the ongoing negotiations towards a Code of Conduct.
Ms. Sorica noted that while both sides maintain their verbal commitment to the COC process, these ongoing disagreements and developments at sea raise critical questions about the likelihood of delivering meaningful progress.
In a recent diplomatic exchange preceding the ASEAN Summit, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi reportedly warned his Philippine counterpart, Foreign Secretary Ma. Theresa Lazaro, about "malicious interference" in their bilateral relationship and urged caution in the South China Sea dispute.
Despite this firm warning, both ministers emphasized the imperative of continued diplomatic dialogue and the proper management of differences, rooted in mutual respect.
The 49th ASEAN Summit will see the Philippines, under President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., host leaders from across Southeast Asia and key dialogue partners. President Marcos Jr. has expressed a desire for progress on the Code of Conduct during the gathering.
While Chinese President Xi Jinping is not expected to attend, Premier Li Qiang will represent Beijing at the summit, maintaining the high-level engagement critical for advancing the talks. The Department of Justice in the Philippines has also affirmed its commitment to strengthening regional cooperation ahead of the summit, with the COC negotiations prominently featuring on the agenda.
The protracted nature of these negotiations, which formally began in 2018 following the non-binding 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, speaks to the immense complexities involved in reconciling deeply entrenched national interests and sovereignty claims.
The region's intricate web of territorial claims — involving China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and Taiwan — coupled with the strategic importance of the South China Sea as a conduit for a substantial portion of global maritime trade, imbues these talks with global significance. Billions of dollars in commerce transit these waters annually, making secure and unimpeded passage a universal concern.
Proposals concerning the conduct of joint military exercises with external powers have long been a significant point of contention in the negotiations, reflecting the deeper geopolitical currents at play in the Indo-Pacific. Claimant states hold differing views on the extent to which the COC should regulate such exercises, balancing national security imperatives with regional stability concerns.
The commitment to the 2026 deadline, reiterated by multiple ASEAN member states and China, offers a glimmer of hope amidst the current frictions. The increasing frequency of negotiation rounds, moving from quarterly to monthly discussions, indicates a tangible effort to accelerate progress and suggests a renewed political will to bridge long-standing gaps.